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FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON POST-REALIST
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND TEACHING: A
BRIEF RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SCORDATO
Gregory Scott Crespi*
In Volume 48 of the Santa Clara Law Review, Professor
Marin Roger Scordato reflected on how law professors who
embrace the instrumental view of law, which is now
dominant in academic circles, should properly discharge their
duties.' Scordato's lengthy article is interesting and
insightful. He provides one of the better recent discussions of
the transition of the legal academy from the early twentieth
century era, when it was dominated by a formalist, doctrinal
jurisprudential approach, to the modern widespread embrace
of an instrumental perspective. His discussion makes clear
that law is no longer regarded by academics as a logically
consistent body of rules that reflects an objective reality, but
instead is now widely viewed as an inherently political and
"value-laden" means of accomplishing contested social
objectives, whose operation is to be judged more by its results
than by its logical consistency.2  He also contributes a
*Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1. Matin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in
the Post-Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353 (2008). "Certainly by the
decade of the 1990s, law schools were overwhelmingly instrumentalist in their
understanding and presentation of the law. . . . [Wie were pretty much all
realists [by then]." Id. at 365.
2. See id. at 359-67. Scordato in this article characterizes "formalist"
jurisprudence as a purportedly objective and mechanistic method of legal
analysis that focuses heavily on the language of judicial precedent, and which
attempts to derive general principles from prior judicial decisions in an objective
fashion and then apply those principles consistently in a logically deductive
manner to resolve new problems. Id. at 355. A judge engaged in formalist
jurisprudence would properly regard himself as merely a "detached analytical
technician" who was not imposing his own value choices when deciding cases.
Id. at 361-62. "Instrumentalist" jurisprudence, in sharp contrast, is described
by Scordato as a mode of analysis based on the premise that legal language is
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thoughtful discussion of the problems that this change
presents for normative legal scholarship, given that this
necessarily broadens the scope of scholarly analysis beyond
the logic and coherence of legal doctrines to also include
investigation of the consequences of laws for the regulated
community.' He convincingly explains that legal scholars
must now have both considerable interdisciplinary expertise
and an ability to engage in sophisticated quantitative
empirical research that extends well beyond the law library to
properly conduct such instrumental analyses, and how this
broader focus sharply undercuts their ability to assert any
special authority with regard to the normative issues
addressed in their work.4
Scordato's article focuses primarily on the question of
how law professors who embrace instrumentalism should
conduct legal scholarship.5 But he also offers some related
suggestions regarding how those professors should discharge
their teaching obligations and their obligations to be of
service to judges and to the practicing legal community.
Much of his analysis is thoughtful and relatively
"rarely self-defining," and that "value-laden choices cannot be avoided in the
process of interpreting and applying legal standards." Id. at 354. The focus of
instrumentalist jurisprudence is instead to identify and examine the social
purposes underlying legal doctrines, and then evaluate the effectiveness of legal
rules in achieving those purposes. Id. at 355. The goal in legal development
and reform, from an instrumentalist perspective, is thus not to bring the law
into closer harmony with some pre-existing, abstract ideal, but instead to more
effectively respond to new social challenges. Id. at 361-62.
Scordato does not draw a sharp distinction in his article between
"instrumentalist" jurisprudence and "realist" or "post-realist" jurisprudence,
and I will use the terms "instrumentalist" and "instrumentalism" broadly
throughout this essay to describe any conception of law that incorporates the
core position taken by the legal realists that legal reasoning is logically
indeterminate and is inherently a value-laden enterprise. In an earlier 2007
article, Scordato provided additional insights regarding his views of the nature
of instrumentalism in a piece that focused on the issues raised by the 1976
California Supreme Court case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). See Marin Roger Scordato, Post-Realist
Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the Hybrid Nature of Common Law
Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263 (2007).
3. See Scordato, supra note 1, at 404-29.
4. "[Ilt may not yet be widely acknowledged, but the shift from formalism
to instrumentalism inevitably results in a profound contraction in the expertise,
and thus the authority, that legal scholars bring to normative legal
scholarship." Id. at 437. See generally id. at 404-29.
5. "It is the purpose of this article to consider some of the consequences for
legal scholarship of this shift from formalism to instrumentalism." Id. at 360.
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uncontroversial in its conclusions. In the interest of brevity, I
will focus in this short response article only upon a few of his
recommendations that I found to be somewhat problematic.
Scordato does an excellent job of describing the tensions
that exist today for those law professors who embrace the
instrumentalist perspective when the everyday world of legal
discourse outside of the academy is still largely dominated by
formalist rhetoric.6 However, some of the recommendations
that he offers to professors, in an attempt to help them
resolve these tensions in their scholarship and teaching, do
not withstand scrutiny, and his otherwise impressive work
merits a brief response pointing out these shortcomings.
The basic difficulty that I have with Scordato's analysis
that underlies all of my criticisms is that while he recognizes
that law professors serve several different functions-
engaging in legal scholarship, teaching law students, and
providing useful service to the bar-he tends to blur critical
distinctions between these functions. As a consequence, he
offers recommendations regarding the conduct of both
scholarship and teaching that inappropriately subject those
activities to evaluative criteria and limitations that are only
properly applicable to the bar service function.
I will proceed by first briefly discussing and criticizing
a few of Scordato's recommendations regarding the conduct
of legal scholarship.7  I will then briefly express my
disagreement with his recommendations regarding how law
professors who embrace instrumentalism should proceed in
their teaching.8 Finally, I will offer a summary conclusion of
my critique. 9
6. See id. at 369-72.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III. I do not have the space in this brief essay to discuss
the work of any of the numerous other scholars who have over the years
addressed one or more of these issues, but I will provide a few references to
some of the more important recent contributions that have been made in this
regard. Scordato, in his article, provides references to the work of a large
number of the more prominent early legal realist writers who have addressed
these issues from the mid-1920s on, and to some more recent writers. Id. at 375
n.95.
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I. SCORDATO'S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Scordato sets forth a useful three-part taxonomy of legal
scholarship that I will also utilize in this response. He first
characterizes as "first-order, or primary, descriptive
scholarship" those efforts that have only the modest objective
of uncritically reporting on and summarizing appellate court
cases, statutes, and regulations. 10  He later defines as
"second-order descriptive scholarship" those more ambitious
efforts that go beyond such narrowly descriptive work and
also attempt to identify the underlying factors that give rise
to legal doctrines and determine their practical effects.'1
Finally, he classifies scholarship that attempts to evaluate
legal doctrines and procedures as "normative legal
scholarship." 2
Scordato notes that the move from formalism to
instrumentalism in the legal academy has not significantly
affected the nature of first-order descriptive scholarship,
although it has led to a radical devaluing of such efforts as
superficial by academics who now largely embrace
instrumentalism. 13  But when second-order descriptive
scholarship is conducted by scholars who embrace the
instrumentalist perspective, the work may well be carried out
in a different fashion than when conducted by formalists.
Such scholarship may culminate in descriptions and
conclusions that are premised on instrumental rather than
formalist reasoning. If so, those conclusions will usually be
more critical of the coherence and consequences of prevailing
legal doctrines, and of prominent legal actors who invoke
those doctrines as justifications for their actions, than would
the conclusions that would result from a more formalist
approach to the subjects of inquiry. But as Scordato correctly
notes, despite the triumph of instrumentalism in the legal
academy, the overwhelming majority of legal opinions and
10. Id. at 372.
11. "[Slecond-order descriptive legal scholarship. . . . seeks to accurately
describe what it is that is motivating the choice of legal doctrine without
the uncritical reliance on the published words of the decision makers, and
without necessarily accepting that the motivating factors are tied to the
furtherance of... the public good." Scordato, supra note 1, at 381.
12. Id. at 404.
13. Id. at 372-74.
[Vol:50284
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pronouncements of political actors at the highest levels of
government continue to be expressed in traditional formalist
terms. 14
Instrumentalist law professors are therefore presented
with a conundrum regarding how they should conduct their
scholarship. Given the persistence of what they regard as
misleading formalist rhetoric in the pronouncements of the
larger legal and political community, what kind of second-
order descriptive scholarship should they seek to produce?
My response is that second-order descriptive efforts should, to
the extent possible, proceed in the normal fashion of scientific
inquiry where the ultimate goal is to produce disinterested,
objective, comprehensive, and accurate descriptions of reality
that lend themselves to empirical testing and falsification,
without regard to how those efforts might be received by the
current legal authorities. A legal scholar, whether of a
formalist or an instrumentalist bent, should ideally
commence her research by positing a tentative explanatory
hypothesis that reflects her best understanding at the outset
of whatever matter she is studying, and then she should be
open to changing her mind, perhaps fundamentally, should
the evidence that she obtains through her research warrant
this outcome. One who embraces instrumentalism should
therefore start from instrumentalist premises, but these
premises should be taken only as tentative working
hypotheses to be critically examined and modified as
necessary in light of the data, and not be regarded as
unquestioned articles of faith that her research must
necessarily affirm.
Scordato has a rather different view of the proper
objectives and orientation of this kind of scholarly work. He
argues that second-order descriptive legal scholarship should
14. "[Plolitical actors at the highest levels of government continue to
espouse the most deterministic version of formalism." Id. at 366. "Despite the
realist revolution and its full acceptance by most law professors, the
overwhelming majority of published trial court memoranda and appellate court
opinions in this country continue to present themselves in traditional formalist
terms." Id. at 370. It is not entirely clear what accounts for this persistence in
the use of formalist rhetoric by political actors and judges long after it has been
discredited among legal academics. Scordato opines that political actors and
judges may be quite aware of the shortcomings of formalist modes of analysis,
yet may be concerned that the public will accord less respect to their
pronouncements, and perhaps even question and challenge their legitimacy, if
they candidly and explicitly accept the instrumentalist paradigm. Id. at 371.
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not seek to achieve the kind of objective, accurate, and
falsifiable descriptions of the world that might be sought by,
for example, physicists and chemists. 5 It should instead
embed any research findings within the framework of rather
Panglossian underlying assumptions that "[e]xisting law is
largely coherent and rational; on the whole, it seeks to further
important social values; those who administer the law and
make critical decisions are, overwhelmingly, striving to be
fair and impartial and are competent at performing the
function." 6
Scordato does not go so far as to claim that these
optimistic assumptions of a coherent and competently and
benevolently administered legal system are descriptively
accurate. He argues, however, that scholarly efforts to
describe various aspects of the operation of the legal system,
even those conducted by instrumentalists who may regard
those optimistic assumptions as untenable, should
nevertheless take those assumptions as premises not open to
question. Scholars should be willing to sacrifice both
accuracy and plausibility if necessary to present descriptions
and explanations that are in accord with those assumptions.
Justifying such a radical departure from the normal ethic
of candid disclosure and commitment to truth and accuracy
that guides scientific inquiry in other fields is quite a tall
order. Scordato boldly claims that legal scholarship that
challenges and contests these optimistic assumptions, "no
matter how accurate and true," is "simply not very useful,
and it is, as a practical matter, not much valued in our
current environment."1 7 Such work "risks rejection as being
outside the purview of legal scholarship and being
unhelpful."" Scholars who wish to do research that is
practical, useful, and helpful should thus avoid offering
fundamental criticisms of the legal system, or of those
persons who exercise legal authority, even if those criticisms
15. "[LIegal scholarship ... is not seeking the kind of disinterested objective
description of reality that one might associate with a nature science like physics
or chemistry." Id. at 382.
16. Id. at 383.
17. Scordato, supra note 1, at 383. Legal scholarship that criticizes
formalist premises "can expect a rather cool reception in the current
environment. Such scholarship .. .simply lacks a receptive audience." Id. at
375.
18. Id. at 432.
[Vol:50
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are accurate.19
I completely disagree. Descriptively accurate scholarship
that departs from these optimistic assumptions set forth by
Scordato may not be particularly "useful" or "valuable" to
persons in positions of legal authority or influence who might
prefer scholarship that depicts them, and the framework of
laws that legitimates their power, in a more favorable light.
Accurate but critical scholarship indeed "risks rejection" by
those persons. But such critical work may be very useful and
valuable to society in that it may help reveal the true state of
affairs for all to see, and can provide support for those
persons who are pursuing worthy legal and institutional
reforms. In any event, while the degree of usefulness for
existing legal authorities may be one of several appropriate
criteria to use for judging the merits of work that is primarily
intended to be of service to judges and to the practicing bar, it
is not an appropriate criterion for judging the merits of
scholarship.
It borders on the outrageous for Scordato to call for
scholars to deliberately sacrifice truth and accuracy in their
work, if necessary, to avoid reaching results that might lead
to criticism of current legal authorities. Legal scholars
obviously are tempted to try to enhance the influence of their
work by presenting their results within a selective context
that is palatable to powerful people.2 ° Some observers have
critically noted that there are a substantial number of
scholars whose work exhibits the earnest and unreflective
high-mindedness and optimism encouraged by Scordato, 2'
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle
Ground," 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075, 2111 (1992) ("[Tlhe scholars are still walking
the tightrope between frankly speaking truth to the powerful and adopting
enough of the discourse and conventions of the powerful to have some influence
in their world.").
21. Professor Robert Gordon notes:
[T]he dominant tone of scholarship is one of earnest high-mindedness
about the legal system, a sustained and rather mystifying optimism. If
anything, in my view, it is all much too soft-edged and sunny, far too
sparing of the dark and bitter realities of legal institutions and social
worlds in which they work.
[But most] scholars continue to assume that the managers of
the legal system want the system to work justly and efficiently and to
serve its best purposes; and that when deficiencies are pointed out, and
rational arguments made for amendment, concerned lawyers will
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perhaps in some instances in an attempt to curry favor with
legal elites. But an instrumentalist scholar whose research
findings question the validity of those optimistic assumptions
has, in my opinion, violated a fundamental canon of
scholarship if she then alters or selectively presents her
results in order to affirm the validity of those assumptions in
an attempt to enhance the "usefulness" and "value" of her
work to existing legal authorities.
At another point in his article, Scordato retreats
somewhat from this rather extreme stance to take a more
moderate position. He recognizes that persons who engage in
second-order descriptive scholarship might reasonably choose
to depart, to some extent, from those optimistic assumptions
of a coherent and benevolently administered legal system so
as to better "satisfy the intellectual demands of realism,"22
i.e., address the criticisms of many instrumentalists who
fundamentally disagree with Scordato and prefer truth and
accuracy over commitment to such assumptions. He concedes
that scholars might properly depart from those optimistic
assumptions, and accept instead as the underlying organizing
premise for their work one or more of several various
alternative assumptions, again without regard for their
descriptive accuracy, so long as those alternative assumptions
still reflect "a wholehearted embrace of the ultimate
rationality, coherence and purposefulness of the law."23
Examples of such alternative assumptions would be that
the legal system is effectively configured so as to achieve
some overarching normative goal or goals, such as "[economic]
efficiency, economic productivity, deterrence, compensation,
risk spreading, [or] beneficial reliance."24 The proper focus of
descriptive legal scholarship would then be to explain legal
doctrines by showing, in a quasi-formalist manner, how those
doctrines are logically entailed by and deductively consistent
with those posited objectives.25 According to Scordato, such
respond with dialogue and collaborate in the reform effort, if necessary
even against their own and their clients' immediate interests.
Id. at 2105, 2112.
22. See Scordato, supra note 1, at 383, 386.
23. Id. at 387.
24. Id.
25. See id. ("In this way, legal scholarship of this sort enjoys the satisfying
appearance of objectivity and logical inevitability that was thought to be the
hallmark of formalism in its heyday while still appearing to be consistent with
[Vol:50
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work that characterizes the legal system as a coherent
framework for achieving certain desirable ends "is likely to
enjoy a far more welcoming reception among the larger legal
community" than would more critical work that called
attention to the indeterminacy and inconsistency of the law
and its manipulation by those in positions of authority to
reach unjust results.26
Just how is this new position an improvement over
Scordato's initial stance, given that it similarly calls for the
sacrifice of truth and accuracy when necessary to conform
one's findings to whatever premises of coherence, rationality,
and purposefulness one has chosen to initially embrace? Let
me quote Scordato on this point: "In this way, legal
scholarship of this sort enjoys the satisfying appearance of
objectivity and logical inevitability that was thought to be the
hallmark of formalism in its heyday while still appearing to
be consistent with post-realist perspectives."27
There you have it. The proper goal of second-order
descriptive legal scholarship is to give an "appearance" of the
objectivity and logical inevitability of the subject doctrines,
even if this is not a particularly accurate depiction of their
nature, while also "appearing" to be consistent with the
instrumental perspective by utilizing one or more common
instrumentalist analytical concepts as the organizing
premises, even though one is now using those concepts as
non-falsifiable articles of faith rather than as tentative
working hypotheses. But work done in this manner, which
rules out of bounds at the outset any critical examination of
its initial organizing premises, regardless of the findings of
the research, and which then alters or selectively presents its
findings so as to render them congenial to those with a
particular ideological orientation, is not worthy of being
regarded as scholarship.
Scordato recognizes the need to address the yawning gap
that exists between either of his suggestions and the far more
demanding standards of conventional scientific inquiry as to
the falsifiability of premises and conclusions.2 He offers, as a
final defense of his position, the argument that descriptive
post-realist perspectives.").
26. Id. at 432.
27. Id. at 387.
28. See Scordato, supra note 1, at 388.
289
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legal scholarship is, by its nature, not something that should
be judged by the objective standards of scientific inquiry that
are applied in other academic disciplines.29  Why not?
Because descriptive accounts of the nature and underlying
causes of a legal doctrine are, in his view, not like a typical
scientific hypothesis because "[tlhere is not really an
expectation that further research and discovery will result in
the refinement of a unified set of principles that can fully
account for all of the law."3 ° Legal scholarship is thus "not
like descriptive efforts in the natural sciences, where the
basic measure of success is the degree to which the
explanation accounts for observable features and predicts
future action."31 The nature of descriptive legal scholarship is
that it cannot "offer an account of the object of study that is,
in a traditional sense, either verifiable or definitively
refutable. 32
It is not simply that Scordato believes that legal
scholarship is unlikely to ever reach the level of
comprehensiveness and accuracy often achieved by the
natural sciences. Descriptive legal scholarship, in his view, is
qualitatively different from scientific inquiry; it is more akin
to literary criticism in that any failure to fully explain the
subject under investigation, or failure to provide empirically
falsifiable predictions, is "more or less irrelevant."33  The
quality and value of legal scholarship should be judged not by
scientific standards,34 but by the "consensus of opinion in the
relevant community .... the degree to which it is considered
interesting and insightful-values that are both highly
contingent and perspective dependent.... Much of the basis
for the evaluation of such work will necessarily be
aesthetic." 35
If I understand Scordato correctly, he is recommending
the use of a novel evaluative standard under which
descriptive legal scholarship that may be good science, in that
29. See id. at 388-94.
30. Id. at 390.
31. Id. at 391.
32. Id. at 433.
33. Id. at 393.
34. "[Blroad vistas of accurate description of the making of law and
its implementation are simply of little value within the realm of legal
scholarship...." Scordato, supra note 1, at 383.
35. Id. at 393-94.
290 [Vol:50
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it is comprehensive, accurate, and advances interesting and
falsifiable predictions, but which reaches conclusions that are
critical of the coherence of legal doctrines or of the motives or
competence of current legal authorities, and is consequently
probably "uninteresting" and "unaesthetic" to most of those
criticized persons, is nevertheless therefore poor scholarship.
In contrast, descriptive legal scholarship that legitimates and
rationalizes existing law is "more valuable . .. than more
critical work, irrespective of the likely underlying accuracy of
the description."36 Such work, even if inaccurate, is likely to
be more interesting and aesthetically pleasing to legal
authorities, and, by this standard, is therefore good
scholarship. Unlike normal scientific research, the quality of
legal scholarship is ultimately a matter of taste-a matter of
opinion on the part of legal elites.
No way! I disagree strongly with Scordato's departure
from normal scientific criteria and his embrace of this
alternative "aesthetic" standard of evaluation of legal
scholarship, and I also do not believe that other instrumental
legal scholars will find Scordato's arguments persuasive.
Descriptive legal scholarship should be judged by the same
scientific criteria that are applied in other fields of social
inquiry. Scordato is doubtless correct in his factual claim
that most current legal scholarship proceeds on the basis of
some very optimistic assumptions regarding the coherence of
the legal system and the competence and benevolence of legal
authorities, rather than on the basis of a much more tentative
and provisional embrace of more accurate, and revealing,
instrumentalist premises.37 This does not, however, justify
his endorsement of this deceptive practice.
My rather harsh criticisms of Scordato's view of how legal
scholarship should be conducted by instrumentalist
professors may, be somewhat unfair, or at least overstated. It
may be that the root of our disagreement is nothing more
than terminological; we may simply be using the word
"scholarship" in fundamentally different ways. He implicitly
treats legal scholarship as being a subordinate part
36. Id. at 397.
37. See id. at 385-86 (discussing the scholarly focus on "various theories of
statutory interpretation" as opposed to "sophisticated lobbyists, special
interests, [and] logrolling or earmarking"); see also Gordon, supra note 20, at
2105, 2012.
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of a larger service function for the practicing bar that
should be oriented towards providing judges and lawyers
with immediately useful materials for rationalizing
and manipulating existing legal doctrines."8 To Scordato,
scholarship that is successful in meeting this goal is valuable,
otherwise it should be regarded as poor scholarship.39 I
regard legal scholarship quite differently. To me it is an
activity that should be oriented towards providing
disinterested scientific discoveries and fruitful and falsifiable
explanations and predictions, and should be judged on that
basis independently of whether it also serves such a narrowly
defined bar service function.
I recognize that academic writers, even instrumentalists,
can and should provide a useful service function for the
judiciary and practicing bar by helping them better
understand and rhetorically manipulate conventional legal
doctrines and formalist modes of analysis. This service
function parallels the way that practicing lawyers provide an
appropriate service for their clients through submitting
advocacy briefs on their behalf in various fora using whatever
modes of expression will be most effective in helping their
clients achieve their objectives. I readily concede that there is
value to work done by law professors along the lines
recommended by Scordato that is intended primarily to be of
immediate practical use to judges and practicing lawyers
whose legal roles essentially require them to use formalist
doctrinal rhetoric. But I object to his referring to such work
that is intended to discharge this bar service function, and
moreover a service function that is defined by Scordato in
very narrow terms, as "scholarship."
Scordato's basic premise is that descriptive legal
scholarship should be conducted and presented so as to be as
"valuable" as possible to judges, practicing lawyers, and law
students, as opposed to scholars simply following the usual
truth-seeking criteria that guide scientific inquiry and letting
the chips fall where they may. This narrow practitioner-
oriented instrumentalism strikes me as a rather dubious
position for a scholar to take, and one that badly undercuts
the central scholarly imperative of the search for objective
38. Scordato, supra note 1, at 386-87.
39. Id. at 387-87, 394-95.
[Vol:50
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truth. Scholars bear a special responsibility to think long and
hard before they sacrifice candor and accuracy in their work
in order to further other social objectives, however worthy
those other objectives may be.
Even if one accepts Scordato's dubious position as to the
proper objective of descriptive legal scholarship, one can still
question his oft-repeated claims that the value of such
scholarship for legal actors is much greater if it is framed
primarily to help them rationalize and manipulate existing
legal doctrines, rather than to illuminate flawed reasoning or
extra-judicial influences on the law, and that this is the case
regardless of whether one account or the other is more
convincing or accurate.*° He may well be correct as to how
law students and established legal actors in prominent
positions themselves judge the relative usefulness of different
kinds of descriptive scholarship for their own particular
purposes. But scholars have their own unique perspectives
and responsibilities. They should make their own assessment
of whether work that serves primarily to legitimate current
legal doctrines, and help legal actors better manipulate those
doctrines, is of greater value to those legal actors than would
be more accurate and truthful descriptions that might help
them better understand the problems of the world that we
live in, and better address the shortcomings of our legal order
in helping to resolve those problems. Scholars should, of
course, also consider the importance of accurate and critical
descriptive scholarship for that subset of legal actors who
may oppose some aspects of the existing legal order, and who
would find such critical scholarship to be helpful assistance
for obtaining the needed institutional reforms. Even if one
accepts Scordato's instrumentalist premise as to the proper
objective of descriptive scholarship, I do not believe that his
conclusions follow as to the necessary superiority of
legitimizing, rationalizing scholarship over more accurate and
critical work. Other prominent legal scholars disagree with
him as well in this regard.4
1
40. "[Dlescriptive legal scholarship that produces the consequence of
legitimizing and rationalizing existing law is considered more valuable, and is
thus likely to garner greater prestige, than more critical work, irrespective of
the underlying accuracy of the description." Id. at 397.
41. One prominent scholar who has also taken a position opposite to that of
Scordato is Professor Gordon. His stance is perhaps best articulated in a piece
293
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II. SCORDATO'S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
TEACHING
Let me now turn briefly to Scordato's recommendations
written in 1992 in response to a now-famous article by Judge Harry Edwards
that was critical of legal academics for a number of reasons. See Gordon, supra
note 20 (citing Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)). Judge
Edwards had argued, in a manner that closely parallels Scordato's later
recommendations, that law professors were producing too much theoretical,
critical scholarship that was of little if any practical assistance to courts and
practitioners who were limited to using "authoritative legal materials," i.e.,
current legal doctrines and formalist modes of analysis, in their work.
Edwards, supra note 41, at 47. Gordon's response essay, as does Scordato's
article, focused primarily upon articulating what the author regards as the
proper scholarly role of law professors, and the following quote from that article
effectively conveys the essence of Gordon's position:
[A] radical critique of existing law is not invalid because it is radical, so
long as it is true. If the legal system or aspects of it are in fact
fundamentally flawed, the exposure of those laws is a signal public
service ....
S. . Just because judges and advocates are compelled by their
roles to accept this fiction [of the validity of formalist jurisprudence], I
do not see why scholars should be ....
... Judge Edwards' view of the "practical" would seem to restrict
scholars to recommending only those changes that current
decisionmakers would be likely to accept in the language that those
decisionmakers like to use. Most scholars-in my view
unfortunately-already accept these restrictions. But legal scholars
have never tied themselves down to immediately realizable reforms,
and they should not start now.... In many instances the audience [for
legal scholarship] is not current officialdom at all, but social
movements and public-interest groups who are trying to change the
political agenda. For such movements, scholarship that documents the
flaws in existing [legal] systems can be a very practical instrument
indeed.
Gordon, supra note 20, at 2089-90. This quote by Gordon emphasizes his view
that instrumental legal scholarship very much has a "practical" aspect to it, and
is thus of service to the bar if both such service and the extent of the "bar" are
broadly understood. My view expressed above in the main text is somewhat
different; I believe that descriptive legal scholarship should first and foremost
proceed in accordance with normal principles of scientific inquiry, without
regard to its practicality. But even if one were to accept Scordato's dubious
premise that legal scholarship should be shaped to better meet the "practical"
demands of judges, practitioners and others, I think that Gordon effectively
defends the social practicality of instrumental analyses that depart from
Scordato's recommended commitment to optimistic premises.
Another prominent legal scholar who has recently taken a similar position
in support of accurate and truthful descriptive scholarship is Erwin
Chemerinsky. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes:
Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1069, 1081 (2006) ("[W]e should abandon the misleading rhetoric of discretion-
free judging and talk about judging as it actually occurs.").
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regarding how law professors should conduct their classes.
Most law students hope to later engage in legal practice, and
there is no question that one of the obligations of a law
professor is to help them to learn how to operate effectively in
the current legal environment. In Scordato's view, this
obligation requires law professors to help their "students to
become conversant with the conventional wisdom and the
body of generally accepted principles and arguments
currently at play," even if "the professor is personally
convinced that much of it serves as a kind of legitimating
myth."
42
This is a relatively uncontroversial position when stated
at this high level of generality. Law students obviously need
to develop an understanding of and facility working with the
formally prevailing legal doctrines in order to become
competent lawyers, regardless of the degree of coherence or
plausibility of those doctrines. Those students often make
great financial and other sacrifices to pursue their studies,
and they have the right to rely upon the faculty members,
that their tuitions largely support, for guidance and
assistance in their efforts to master their craft. But any
professor who embraces the instrumentalist perspective
recognizes that even an encyclopedic knowledge of legal
doctrine and a complete mastery of formalist legal reasoning
techniques are not alone sufficient skills. A good lawyer also
needs to be able to go beyond formalist rhetoric to recognize
and address, in some fashion, the true underlying grounds of
legal decisions, and to be able to evaluate the operation of
existing or proposed legal rules in their actual social contexts.
The difficult issue for a professor who embraces
instrumentalism is the proper balance that she should strike
between helping students learn the conventional legal
doctrines and develop facility with standard formalist judicial
reasoning, as compared to helping them to see the limitations
of such conventional rhetoric and develop an aptitude for
recognizing and effectively addressing the true sources of
judicial, legislative, and administrative decisions. There is a
trade-off here that simply cannot be avoided because there is
only so much class and study time available, and some
worthy pedagogical objectives must inevitably be
42. Scordato, supra note 1, at 378-79.
295
296 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
subordinated to others. Just how important for the students'
professional future is developing their knowledge of doctrine
and their facility with formalist modes of reasoning, when
these goals can only be accomplished at the cost of less
adequately preparing them to identify, and effectively
address what an instrumentalist professor would regard as
the true underlying grounds of legal decisions?
Scordato comes down rather forcefully on the side of
giving relatively greater emphasis to the coverage of doctrine
and formalist analysis, and recommends that the
instrumentalist critique of this material that is provided be
limited to just a few illustrative examples.4 3 Now, this would
not be a surprising position for someone to take who had
serious reservations about the accuracy or ethical
underpinnings of the instrumentalist conception of law.4
Scordato, however, is by no means a critic of instrumentalism
as an approach to understanding law,45 although as discussed
above he favors the use of formalist, or quasi-formalist,
43. Scordato states:
[W]hile a law professor would certainly want to expose her students to
the realist perspective and to illustrate it on one or two actual cases, it
is simply not ... a very effective presentation to students learning a
legal subject for the first time to continue time after time to subject the
appellate cases in the casebook to one variation or another of the
standard realist critique.
Once the point is made and illustrated a time or two that courts are
frequently disingenuous in the deterministic manner in which they
explicitly justify their holdings, there is not much more to say.
Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).
44. For example, see the well-known and harsh critiques made of law
professors who embrace an instrumentalist orientation by Dean Paul
Carrington and Judge Harry Edwards. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the
River, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("The professionalism and intellectual
courage of lawyers does not require rejection of Legal Realism .... What it
cannot abide is the embrace of nihilism. . . . Teaching cynicism may, and
perhaps probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery
and intimidation."); Edwards, supra note 41. See also Gordon, supra note 20, at
2078 (finding Judge Edwards' position in the above-cited article "depends on a
conception of the judge as primarily a law-declarer and only marginally and
incrementally a policymaker," and Judge Edwards believes that "the main
business of scholars should be to help judges, and lawyers arguing before them,
to 'find' the existing law-all presented in the conventional form of judicial-
doctrine discourse").
45. "It was very satisfying [for Scordato as a young law professor] to guide
students away from the innocent faith in an objective, mechanistic notion of law
and to help them develop an ability to identify plausible policy concerns and to
use them to craft persuasive legal arguments." Scordato, supra note 1, at 355.
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premises in second-order descriptive scholarship, even by
instrumentalist scholars who find such premises to be
fundamentally flawed, so as to render that work more
"valuable" to law students and to the established legal
community. In any event, he clearly recognizes that
instrumentalism is now the overwhelmingly dominant
orientation in legal academia. His recommendations
regarding scholarship and teaching are primarily directed
towards those many academics who wholeheartedly embrace
instrumentalism, rather than to those persons that may
harbor some reservations about that approach.
In Scordato's view, the professional education context in
which law teaching takes place "more or less compels" even a
professor who embraces instrumentalism to present legal
doctrines as essentially "coherent, rational and largely
aligned with the conventionally understood public good," and
to "abandon the more cynical or radical aspects of her
understanding" in an effort to help the students learn to work
effectively within the current legal environment.4 6  This
position closely parallels his recommendation that the second-
order descriptive scholarship that academics produce should
reflect the same optimistic premises of coherence,
competence, and benevolence. He notes at several points in
his article that there is enormous pressure placed on law
professors, not only by the professional legal community, but
also by law students, to focus their pedagogical efforts
primarily on helping their students master doctrine and
formalist analysis rather than criticizing them.47
46. Id. at 380.
47. "[P]olitical actors at the highest level of government continue to espouse
the most deterministic version of formalism." Id. at 366. "[Tlhe overwhelming
majority of published trial court memoranda and appellate court opinions in
this country continue to present themselves in traditional formalist terms. Id.
at 370. "[Judges) may be justifiably concerned that an explicitly
instrumentalist presentation of their analysis and conclusions would risk a
lessening in the respect granted to their decisions . . . ." Id. at 371. "[A] law
professor faces very real pressure to maintain and to reinforce a legitimizing
attitude towards the law." Id. at 376. "[Elnormous implicit pressure exists to
present the substance of legal doctrine to students, especially in core law school
courses, from a largely formalist perspective." Id. at 377. Professors work in a
context that "more or less compels them to present the procedures and the
doctrine as coherent, rational and largely aligned with the conventionally
understood public good." Id. at 380.
Scordato has apparently been thinking about the tensions between the
instrumentalism that dominates the legal academy and the formalist rhetoric
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Instrumental explanations of law, "even if entirely realistic
and accurate," are, in Scordato's view, "simply not
particularly relevant to, nor useful in, the practice of law,"4
and are "hardly an uplifting intellectual experience for
students."49
As support for this argument, Scordato provides an
extended discussion of a hypothetical tax law provision that
he posits was adopted only because of special interest
pressures, and he concludes that even a completely accurate
instrumental explanation of this provision "would be of very
little sustained usefulness to . . . a law student."50  He
similarly argues that a corporate law scholar who was
convinced of the accuracy of an instrumentalist explanation of
current corporate law rules of the nature of their being
completely subservient to corporate management interests
should "introduce this idea" to their students, but that it
would be "tedious" and "ineffective" for that professor to base
his presentations exclusively on that perspective. 51
Once again, I strongly disagree. Just because law
students, practitioners, judges, and other existing legal
authorities might prefer that law professors focus primarily
upon conventional doctrines and formalist analytical
methods, and soft-pedal their more critical instrumentalist
insights,5" this does not mean that professors who are not
under the same constraints53 should acquiesce to these
that dominates in the larger legal culture for a number of years. See generally
Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (1990) (explaining, at an earlier time, his views regarding
the way that law courses should be taught, given this tension).
48. Scordato, supra note 1, at 381.
49. Id. at 378.
50. Id. at 382.
51. Id. at 378.
52. Scordato states:
[Jiudges issuing binding and authoritative judgments in actual cases
face powerful practical incentives to present their decisions in largely
formalist terms.... [Tihey may fear that an explicit and widespread
embrace by the courts of the instrumentalist paradigm would
eventually result in a serious questioning of, and ultimate challenge to,
the legitimacy of their authority.
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). He also notes: "[M]any students still come into
first-year law school courses harboring expectations about the determinacy and
the mechanistic nature of legal rules." Id. at 365. "[P]olitical actors at the
highest levels of government continue to espouse the most deterministic version
of formalism." Id. at 366.
53. "[Llaw professors ... face no such practical impediments [as do judges]
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wishes. A law professor who embraces instrumentalism
should devote substantial efforts to helping students master
the ability to critique a broad range of legal doctrines and
formalist reasoning techniques from an instrumentalist
perspective, even if these efforts necessitate her curtailing, to
some significant extent, the basic explication of those
doctrines and modes of reasoning.
Scordato has again conflated two distinct professorial
functions. He has blurred the distinction between the
teaching and the service to the bar roles of legal academics,
and then has subordinated the professorial obligation to help
law students develop the most accurate understanding
possible of the legal system to the service function of
providing these soon-to-be members of the bar with the
particular knowledge and skills that will be of most
immediate usefulness to them in the everyday legal contexts
where formalist doctrines are still accorded respect. Such
subordination does not strike the proper classroom balance
favored by most instrumentalist professors; far less coverage
of doctrine and formalist analysis, and far more emphasis on
fundamental, instrumentalist critiques of the legal system.
CONCLUSION
Law professors today face some significant intellectual
problems. They now overwhelmingly embrace an
instrumentalist conception of law as an inherently political
and value-laden means of accomplishing contested social
objectives, and generally believe that the legal system should
be judged more by its results than by its coherence or logical
consistency. But outside of the legal academy, the large
majority of legal opinions and pronouncements of political
actors at the highest levels of government continue to be
expressed in traditional, formalist terms that suggest that the
legal system is a logically consistent body of rules that
reflects an underlying objective reality. How are
instrumental law professors to properly discharge their
scholarship, teaching, and service to the legal profession
obligations, given this sharp tension between their personal
beliefs and the public rhetoric-if not necessarily the true
to embracing the greater accuracy of the realist account and the instrumentalist
paradigm that flows from it.. .. " Id. at 371.
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beliefs-of leading legal authorities and practitioners? And
how can they develop the considerable interdisciplinary
expertise and quantitative empirical analysis skills that are
clearly necessary if they are to be able to carry out normative
analyses that will merit the respect of scholars in those
various disciplines?
Professor Marin Scordato has done an excellent job
describing the evolution and nature of these problems, and in
emphasizing their importance for law professors. However, I
take strong issue with some of his recommendations as to
how this tension between a commitment to instrumentalism
and the larger universe of formalist legal discourse should be
resolved. His basic problem is that he blurs the distinct
scholarship, teaching, and service to the bar aspects of the
law professor role, and then subjects the scholarship and
teaching aspects of that role to evaluative criteria and
limitations that are appropriate only for the bar service
function, and, for that matter, appropriate only if that bar
service function is rather narrowly defined so as to be limited
to work that is of immediate usefulness to judges and
practitioners in every day legal contexts.
With regard to what Scordato refers to as "second-order
descriptive scholarship"-scholarship that goes beyond
narrow summary and description and attempts to identify the
underlying factors that give rise to legal doctrines and
determine their practical effects-I disagree strongly with his
conclusions regarding how it should be conducted. For the
reasons that I have given, I am of the view that such efforts
should be undertaken in accordance with the normal
scientific goal of reaching objective, disinterested, accurate,
and fruitful falsifiable explanations and predictions. If the
research that is done in this fashion leads to critical
conclusions that call into question the operation of the legal
system, and undercut the authority of some prominent legal
actors, then so be it. I reject Scordato's suggestions that such
scholarship can only be meaningfully assessed by aesthetic
standards applied by legal elites rather than by normal
scientific criteria, and that scholarship should be premised on
and ultimately be supportive of the assumption that the legal
system is coherent and competently and benevolently
managed, or at least on the assumption that the legal system
is rational and coherent in achieving some worthy overriding
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social objective. Those assumptions may be the prevailing
working assumptions among the leading members of the legal
community outside of academia, but those assumptions
should not be allowed to impede scholarly efforts that may
illuminate their shortcomings.
With regard to teaching law students, Scordato
recommends that even those professors who wholeheartedly
embrace instrumentalism should, nevertheless, devote the
bulk of their instructional efforts to covering conventional
doctrines and formalist analytical methods, and should
devote only a small amount of time and effort to exposing
their students to a few illustrative examples of
instrumentalist critiques of this material. For reasons
discussed above, I disagree, and recommend that
instrumentalist law professors should try to strike a balance
in their classes that gives far greater relative emphasis to
instrumentalist critiques, as compared to conventional
doctrines and formalist analysis, than Scordato recommends.
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